GPU-TEE Attestation
The kernel’s attestation/ domain (INIT-MOONSHOT MD3) verifies a
confidential-compute (GPU-TEE) attestation quote and normalizes it to a
vendor-name-free receipt. It is a govern-and-prove primitive: a known-good quote
verifies, a tampered quote fails closed, and a replayed nonce is rejected.
It ships on the dedicated subpath so consumers import only the attestation surface:
Verification is fail-closed
Section titled “Verification is fail-closed”verifyGpuAttestationQuote accepts an EAT (Entity Attestation Token) quote in
JWT shape — base64url(header).base64url(payload).base64url(signature) — and
returns a GpuAttestationReceipt. It never throws to bypass a check and never
returns verified: true on a path that did not pass every gate. Every failure
path returns a receipt with verified: false:
- malformed quote (wrong segment count, undecodable JSON, unknown
alg), - bad signature (verified against the caller-supplied PEM trust anchor),
- measurement mismatch (the quote’s RIM digest is not in
expectedMeasurements), - stale or replayed nonce.
The verification gates, all of which must pass:
- The quote parses and its JOSE
algmaps to a supported digest (ES256 / ES384 / ES512). - The signature verifies against the relying party’s trust anchor
(
verificationKeyPem). - The quote’s
eat_nonceequals theexpectedNonce(freshness). - The provider’s overall-result claim and every RIM-verified claim are boolean
true— the claim keys are supplied by the caller as an opaqueAttestationClaimProfile, never hardcoded in the kernel. - The GPU
DIGESTmeasurement matches one ofexpectedMeasurements.
Replay rejection
Section titled “Replay rejection”An optional ReplayNonceTracker makes nonces single-use. A successful verify
consumes its nonce; a failed verify never consumes one (a transient failure
does not burn a still-valid nonce). A subsequent verify presenting an
already-consumed nonce is rejected with verified: false.
Vendor-name-free receipt
Section titled “Vendor-name-free receipt”The GpuAttestationReceipt reasons about the attesting hardware only through an
opaque provider_family label — GPU_TEE_PROVIDER_FAMILY is
'confidential-gpu'. No hardware brand string appears in the receipt type or in
the verification branch logic. Provider-specific wire-protocol field names are
supplied by the caller as an opaque AttestationClaimProfile, so brand-bearing
claim keys live behind a workspace-owned config layer, never in the kernel type
system. This is the kernel-side application of the
campus governance boundary’s
vendor-name-free invariant.
Recording the campus event
Section titled “Recording the campus event”buildGpuAttestationRecordedEvent is a pure factory that normalizes a receipt
into a campus:gpu_attestation_recorded-compatible payload, so the campus pack
records a GPU-TEE attestation without re-deriving the receipt’s fields. The event
kind is GPU_ATTESTATION_RECORDED_KIND ('campus:gpu_attestation_recorded'),
one of the five event kinds the campus telemetry pack emits.
See also
Section titled “See also”- Campus Pack — records the
campus:gpu_attestation_recordedevent this primitive produces. - Campus Governance Boundary — the vendor-name-free invariant this receipt enforces.