Skip to content

Campus Governance Boundary

LumenFlow’s campus governance layer lets a deployment reason about campus-scale compute — telemetry, tenant evidence, attested execution, and (in a later, explicitly-gated phase) energy — under three load-bearing boundaries. This page is the public, user-facing equivalent of the internal architecture decision that ratifies those boundaries.

Proposes, never actuates

Campus packs emit a proposal — a structured recommendation against physical power. The customer’s scheduler (a system outside LumenFlow’s trust boundary) is the only thing that actuates. No pack holds actuation capability over physical power.

Vendor-name-free

Governance reasons in opaque, semantic labels — capability_tier, provider_family, data_egress_class — never concrete vendor brand strings. No vendor name appears in published types or in branch logic.

Refuse over fallback

When a constraint cannot be met, the resolver refuses rather than silently downgrading. One narrow, default-off, audited opt-out (allow_same_family_reviewer) is the only relaxation.

1. LumenFlow proposes, the scheduler actuates

Section titled “1. LumenFlow proposes, the scheduler actuates”

The hard line: campus packs propose, the scheduler actuates.

A campus pack may recommend an action against physical power — curtail this load, shift this batch — by emitting a proposal that carries the reasoning, the affected load, and the supporting evidence. It stops there. The customer’s energy scheduler reads the proposal, applies its own policy, and decides whether to act. Actuation lives with the scheduler, outside LumenFlow’s trust boundary.

  • No pack holds a capability that actuates physical power. There is no power:curtail, power:dispatch, or power:set_setpoint capability in any registry, and adding one requires a fresh decision an operator can read and accept first.
  • The flexible-load surface exposes exactly one verb, propose_curtailment, which emits a proposal and returns. A negative test asserts the tool cannot actuate physical power — the only observable effect of calling it is a proposal record.

This is the same evidence-based control-plane boundary LumenFlow applies to every state-mutating action: the framework surfaces a recommendation for an external decision-maker; it never reaches across the boundary and changes the governed system itself.

Campus governance reasons about compute in opaque, semantic labels:

LabelWhat it describes
capability_tierWhat a compute source can do — not who provides it.
provider_familyAn opaque grouping for separation-of-duties (e.g. a reviewer must be outside the family that produced the work).
data_egress_classWhere data may flow (e.g. campus_restricted vs. less-restricted classes).

No vendor brand string appears in a published type, in resolver or policy branch logic, or in a registry/policy key. Where vendor identity must exist at all, it lives in opaque configuration values mapped behind the semantic labels — never in the type system and never in control flow. A negative test proves no vendor-name branch exists.

This is the campus-side application of the same principle LumenFlow uses for agent surfaces and model routing: shared contracts express semantic intent, and vendor-specific mapping is a workspace-owned translation layer, not a value baked into the framework. Published @lumenflow/* exports stay stable across vendor churn.

When a campus policy constraint cannot be satisfied, the resolver refuses. It does not silently fall back to a weaker posture, pick the next-best option, or downgrade data_egress_class to make the work fit. A silent fallback under a governance regime runs work that should have been blocked, under a posture nobody approved — the exact failure the regime exists to prevent.

The canonical case is family separation: a reviewer must be outside the provider_family that produced the work. When no such reviewer exists, the resolver refuses by default.

One narrow opt-out exists:

  • allow_same_family_reviewer is default-off. When an operator explicitly enables it, the resolver may permit a same-family reviewer as permit-with-audit-warning — the permit is recorded with a warning naming the relaxed constraint, the family involved, and the operator decision that enabled it. It is never a silent permit.

The relaxation is tightly scoped: it applies to flexible-inference work only, and is the single permitted exception. Energy work carries mandatory negative tests proving it does not relax refusal for campus_restricted data or for family-separation rules.

  • Kernel overview — the domain-agnostic runtime these boundaries compose with.
  • Scope intersection — the 4-level permission check that backs capability gating.
  • Policy engine — the deny-wins cascade that makes refuse-over-fallback the default.